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Strange Encounters: Exploring Law and Film in the Affective Register
Ruth Buchanan and Rebecca Johnson∗

“…thinking is periodically nudged, frightened, inspired, or terrorized into
action by strange encounters.” (Connolly, 2002: 94)
In Culture and Imperialism (1984), Edward Said compellingly argued that a culture’s stories participate
in creating (what Raymond Williams referred to as) “structures of feeling.” Focusing on the 19th
century novel, Said laid bare the political dimensions of popular culture, showing how these texts (and
their structures of feeling) supported, elaborated, and consolidated practices of empire, and the
production of colonial subjects. In 1986, Anthony Chase bemoaned the propensity of critical legal
scholarship to neglect the place of popular culture in maintaining (and challenging) the legitimacy of
legal ordering (Chase, 1986). But over the past 20 years, legal scholars have taken up the challenge,
increasingly making ‘the cultural turn.’ There is a rich and growing body of scholarship located at the
intersection of Law and Film (Bergman & Asimow, 1996; Machura & Robson, 2001; Sarat et al., 2005;
Moran et al., 2004). This scholarship is wide-ranging, touching on an astonishing number of topics and
filmic texts. As one might expect, much of the scholarship explores films with explicit connections to
law. Trial films, lawyer movies, and police dramas provide the sites for exploration of a wide range of
legal topics: crime, punishment, divorce, child custody, property, tort, environmental law. But there is
also evidence of an increasingly expansive approach to the question of ‘what is law’, of ‘where’ and
‘how’ law functions. Scholars are working within a range of less expected genres such as The
Western, Sci-Fi, Romance and Horror to consider how structures of feeling sustain and constitute law
and contemporary legal subjectivities.
Law-and-Film scholarship is founded on a variety of different premises. Kamir (2006) explores three
that have been particularly influential. One is that film parallels law. Scholarship here explores
moments where ‘film imitates law’, where ‘law imitates film,’ and where a series of feedback loops
result in mutual projects of construction. Using such an approach, one can explore how law and film
work similarly to construct the normal family (Johnson, 2000), or consider the relationship between
contemporary anti-stalking legislation, and the filmic stalkers memorialized in films like Taxi Driver or
Fatal Attraction (Kamir, 2000). A second premise is that films are jurisprudential texts. Here, scholars
use film in robust and creative ways to explore topics ranging from gender roles, familial structures,
and human relations, to memory, tragedy and truth. For instance, a movie like The Sweet Hereafter
offers space for thinking about law and fatherhood (Sarat, 2000), Chocolat for theorizing about
alternative dispute resolution (Schulz, 2006), It’s a Wonderful Life for considering constitutional
theory (Denvir, 1996), and Buffy the Vampire Slayer for exploring the jurisprudence of difference and
desire (MacNeil, 2003). A third premise links film to processes of indoctrination and judgment. Here,
scholarship explores the ways that filmic texts teach us to judge the world in certain ways, participating
in the constitution of subjects and communities. Whether in Unforgiven (Miller, 1998), Minority
Report (MacNeil, 2005), Disney movies (Giroux, 1996), or filmed criminal confessions (Silbey 2007),
scholars show how viewers are actively positioned by film to identify with certain points of view; to
see some groups of people as trustworthy, dangerous, disgusting, laughable; to experience some kinds
of violence as normal; to see some lives as lightly expendable.
The breadth of approaches, premises, and directions in the scholarship reveals something about the
incredible variety of concerns and questions operating for legal scholars who engage with film
(Johnson & Buchanan, 2001; Johnson, 2006). But even in the face of this richness of questions and
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approaches, it seems clear that when legal scholars turn to film, there is frequently much in the
encounter that is familiar. Both ‘Law’ and ‘Film’ are meaning-making institutions, sites for the
circulation of the stories society tells about itself (Buchanan & Johnson, 2005). These legal and
cinematic stories participate in constructing as well as in reflecting upon our nomos (Cover 1983;
Black, 1999). It is hardly surprising, then, to see legal scholars bring their often formidable skills of
narrative deconstruction and analysis to bear on the film’s story. Certainly, in our own work, we have
been conscious of the pull that ‘the story’ exerts on our efforts to think through the film, drawing us
back to words and plot, and away from the elements of the movies that distinguish the experience of
reading from that of viewing.
The pull to the familiar – to words – is interesting, particularly since our experience of being film
viewers is that movies do much more than tell stories, however powerful those stories are. We have
been drawn to work at the intersection of law and film in large measure because of films that have
disturbed, irritated, or intrigued us. And yet, we have remained uncomfortably conscious of the lack of
(legal) vocabulary to talk about these affects. Law-and-Film scholarship appears to be
uncharacteristically tongue-tied about the fact that, as viewers, many are profoundly moved by film, as
well as about the related questions of how film does this to us, and how one might write about it.
The discomfort with the pull of the affective dimension of law/film is linked, we suspect, to deep
propensities in legal (and modern) thinking to focus on ‘cognition’. The goal is to analytically,
rationally, or narratively convince ourselves and others of the veracity or persuasiveness of a particular
account of things. In the context of law’s system-preserving tendencies, critical legal scholarship is
frequently concerned with accounts that are overlooked or ignored by the mainstream. Its goal is to
persuade readers that things could be understood differently, that they (and by extension, law) should
be able to engage with and respond to the claims or experiences of differently situated individuals,
whether they be women, indigenous people, or refugees. But even in the process of formulating
arguments about fundamental justice, about the ways the law fails to address the needs of differentially
situated subjects, we rein in the affective dimension, preferring to remain in the cognitive register,
separating reason from emotion, what we think from what we feel, the objective from the subjective.
There is, of course, a historically rich tradition of critique, contesting these distinctions, and rendering
visible the part these dichotomous orderings play in structuring social, legal and political power
(Spivak, 1999). Increasing attention is being paid to questions of emotion in law (Bandes, 2001;
Maroney, 2006; Roach Anleu & Mack, 2005). Developments in neuroscience have refocused attention
on the embodied aspects of thought, and the importance of affect to decision making (Kahan et al,
2007). This approach to embodied thought works from a premise familiar to many of us from reflection
on our personal experiences: thinking differently is tremendously difficult. Something usually needs to
happen to you to ‘startle’ (or nudge, frighten, inspire) new thoughts into being. We are beginning to
understand that this is because there is much more that is affective, sensory, and embodied about
‘thinking’ than we typically imagine. William Connolly (2002) describes this as the ‘multilayered’
nature of thinking. If we leave the affective dimension out of our own accounts of how we ‘make up’
our minds and how we ‘change’ them, Connolly believes, we overlook the most powerful, creative and
transformative dimension of thought:
You cannot appreciate the creative possibilities of thinking without coming to terms with the
layered play of affect in it; but you cannot fit thought entirely into a closed schema of logic,
narrative, discourse, expression, or explanation if you do attend to the play of affect. It is
through the play of affect—partly within the orbit of feeling, intention, and consciousness and
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partly below their thresholds—that the creative element of thinking finds its most energetic
impetus and possibility. (Connolly, 2002: 75)
Augusto Boal, working with the traditions of Theatre of the Oppressed (1979)and Legislative Theatre
(1998), argues that thinking anew requires not just mental gymnastics, but very concrete techniques and
games to reinforce that the whole body thinks, not just the brain (2002). The project is to develop all
our aesthetic forms for the perception of reality: Words, Images, Sound (Boal, 2006: 44-48). He draws
these three ways of knowing together, arguing that, just as breathing involves not just the lungs but the
whole body, so too thought is embedded in the whole body. Similar insights are deeply rooted in
indigenous pedagogy and practice which situates learning in the midst of other practices.1
Taking seriously the embodied and affective dimensions of thought is important in relation both to the
critical and transformative possibilities of Law-and-Film scholarship. Work needs to be done to more
effectively reveal the ways films work to produce structures of feeling that help to cohere
contemporary legal and political institutions. What, for example, are the connections between the
sense of anxiety and pervasive dread that one experiences in a range of recent films (including Minority
Report), and the powerfully charged emotive state that helps to reinforce the legal justifications for the
expansion of the apparatuses of the security state in our post-9-11 era? And how might film challenge
or destabilize dominant ‘structures of feeling,’ revealing new potential subjectivities and ways of being
in the world? An illustration of this latter approach is found in JK Gibson-Graham’s (2006)
consideration of The Full Monty. The men in this film – laid-off factory workers – refuse to inhabit
fully the structures of feeling expected of men in their circumstances. Instead of sitting around feeling
useless, the unemployed men re-envision themselves as performers, and organize a strip show for the
women of the town. In Gibson-Graham’s analysis of a playful scene in which one of the men standing
in the ‘pogey’ line up ‘swerves’ into a series of dance steps, they begin to reveal the profoundly
transformative potential of re-imagining subjectivity, and the ways in which this is a process woven
through with affect.
Taking inspiration from this approach, we explore in this paper some of the possibilities for thinking
which can be nudged into existence through heightened attention to that which is strange and
unfamiliar in the encounter of Law and Film, that is, through attention to the place of affect in the
constitution of legal subjectivities. But such work requires a more robust vocabulary for discussing
how films work on us, including the relationship of words/images/sounds and how certain filmic
effects make us ‘think/feel’. In the first part of the paper, we will thus focus on questions of method
and vocabulary. What are some of the tools available to Law-and-Film scholars who wish to attend
more closely to the affective domain of film? What are the vocabularies through which we can engage
in a closer exploration of film’s affective powers?
In the second part, we put this provisional language to work in an examination of one scene from each
of three films, The Piano (1993, Jane Campion), Minority Report (2002, Steven Spielberg), and
Deadman (1995, Jim Jarmusch). The three films provide a rich variety of contexts for analyzing the
structures of feeling that help to produce and hold in place certain types of legal subjects, as well as
well as how these subjectivities might be challenged and destabilized. In The Piano we see the
violence of marital property law in the era of ‘coverture’ laid bare in an unflinching account of its
profound effects on the mute Ada, whose only means of communication – her piano – is sold by her
husband. Minority Report, as we’ve observed, projects our contemporary obsession with surveillance
and security into a dystopic near future in which a method has been devised to capture criminals before
they commit their crimes. In Dead Man, perplexingly, the colonial encounter between a young
innocent from Cleveland and an indigenous man is turned on its head, as the doomed accountant
3

becomes an outlaw, and the educated indigenous man he encounters becomes his friend, his protector
and his teacher.
There is much to say about law and legal subjectivity in each of these films. Here, however, our focus
is narrow. We restrict our discussion to a specific scene in each film, lasting from one to five minutes,
which produces a strong and distinctive ‘affect.’ By attending closely to the way that the films are
working on us in these scenes, we hope to be able to understand better how affect – our pre-cognitive
responses to particular combinations of word/image/sound – might be linked to more discernable
emotional states.2 In focusing our attention on these powerful scenes and how they work, we do not
suggest that a film’s story is unworthy of attention. Rather, we attempt to feel our way towards a
language and a method for engaging with film’s other dimensions. In the concluding section, we
speculate about the implications of a greater attentiveness to the specificity of film as a medium, its
participatory nature and its necessary unfolding in time, for ongoing scholarly work in Law-and-Film.
PART I: New Registers for Thinking: Technique, Perception, Affect.
Law and Film both enjoy the power to mediate the social imaginary. Here, we explore the resonance of
this insight in the register of affect and intensity, movement and change. This demands a different
approach to doing theory. As Andrew argues, “film is not a product but an organically unfolding
creative process in which the audience participates both emotionally and intellectually.”(1976: 66-67)
Seeing a film is not just an exercise in imagining alternatives; it is an unfolding experience in time. It
is an event shaded with particular embodied dimensions: one’s heart races, pupils contract, skin
shivers, muscles tense. Involuntary sensations of nausea or vertigo combine with cognitive responses
to produce the lived experience of viewing a particular film that is incorporated into one’s sensibility,
sometimes very powerfully. It is not just that the mind has spent time in a darkened theatre. The body
has also had an affect-laden auditory, visual, and tactile encounter. The affect-rooted experience of the
film is a piece of the subject’s past, its history, its self. This is another way to understand how film not
only represents the world, but participates in its making.
To understand fully how films do their work on/through/with us, we need to develop conceptual and
analytic tools better able to engage with what is going on in this dynamic register. In our search for
new concepts and new registers for thinking, one source of inspiration has been the Bergsonian
influenced philosophical tradition that attends to process and change (Bogue, 2003). This new
interdisciplinary configuration of scholarship draws together a Spinozist tradition in political theory
with new interest in neuropyschology and embodied subjectivity. William Connolly (2002), Paul
Patton (2000), J.K. Gibson-Graham (2006), Brian Massumi (2002) and Patricia Pisters (2003), all
readers of Gilles Deleuze, have inspired our interest in ‘affect’ and its significance for thinking
differently about law and film. In this paper, however, we are not offering a reading of Deleuze (or of
the Deleuzians); rather, we are interested in the uses to which we can put a limited range of Deleuzian
inflected concepts. Following Patricia Pister’s approach to working with film as a dynamic process in
which we participate as embodied viewers, our goal is to use these concepts to ask “What new thoughts
become possible? What new emotions can I feel? What new sensations and perceptions can be opened
in the body?” (2003: 9)
A second source of inspiration has been those political and social theorists attempting to grapple
seriously with the insights of neuroscience, particularly the embodied dimensions of thought.
Thinking, decision-making, even moral reasoning, are now understood as governed by complex,
biological brain systems, operating at different speeds and in different registers, not all of which are
subject to cognitive control. You can have a feeling without an emotion (a shiver can come from being
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cold, and not only from being scared). You can also have a feeling that makes you think you are
having an emotion.3 We perceive and we come to give those feelings ‘meaning’ in ways that are
mediated through the body. In addition to accounting for ‘emotions’ and their implications for judging
(Belleau & Johnson, 2007), we need to account for ‘pre-cognitive’ registers of ‘affect’—those things
that may be shaping our thinking before we are even aware of them (Gladwell, 2005). These precognitive ‘intensities’ (as Massumi calls them) are a significant part of what is being produced by the
visual and auditory dimensions of films.
But this emphasizes the need to attend not only to the register of ‘representation’ (the film as ‘text’) but
also to the register of ‘affect’ (the film as ‘event’). Film’s affective power comes in large measure
from its ability to incorporate Images and Sound. An understanding of how film operationalizes affect
through image and sound is facilitated by familiarity with cinematic techniques. Bordwell and
Thompson (2004) direct attention to some of the cinematic techniques that are central to the power of
film: techniques of ‘Image’, of ‘Time’ and of ‘Sound’. The first set of techniques (those of the Image)
has to do with the construction of ‘the shot’ (Bordwell & Thompson, 2004: 175-199). Here, one asks
questions about the mise-en-scene (literally, all that which is put into the picture: actors, costumes,
makeup, props, lighting, setting) and about the cinematography (film stock, camera
lenses/location/movement, how the shot is filmed). Attending to the first of these (mise-en-scene)
means asking about the images that appear in the film frame: certainly, setting is often much more than
backdrop, and plays an important part in the affective weight of a given scene. Just consider the
crashing waves on the New Zealand beach in The Piano, the claustrophobic urban landscape of
Minority Report, or the Makah village in Dead Man.
In thinking about the affective dimensions of the shot, one can ask questions about ‘tone’, about
‘composition’, and about ‘movement’. Film stock and lighting play an important part in constructing
the tone of the image (Bordwell & Thompson, 2004: 191-198). The film stock may be color or black
and white, and variations in each produce the possibilities of heightened contrast, directing the viewer’s
eye in different ways. The film stock chosen (and the speed of filming) can produce images that seem
to have newsreel-like quality, to have a grainy ‘home video’ feel, to be bleached out, or to be drenched
with heavily saturated hues. Laboratory processes can also alter the image: tinting or toning, adding
color to portions of film shot in black and white, using filters, under exposing to create shadowy
regions, overexposing to produce the effect of blinding light. The number of frames per shot can
produce slow- or fast-motion effects. All these techniques participate in constructing the tone and
atmosphere of the image. Depending on whether the product is shadowy half-darkness or light-filled
airiness, we come to expect and feel different things from the scene.
There are other questions to ask about the composition of the image (Bordwell & Thompson, 2004:
Chapter 7). How is the onscreen space constructed? What is the position of characters and objects in
the frame, and the relationship between them? What can be said about balance and depth? How do
choices about positioning of the camera influence our points of ‘view’? Here, one might ask about
camera distance, focus, and angle of shot, as well as about viewpoint in the more traditional sense of
the word. With respect to the camera distance, closer shots can produce intimate or oppressive
feelings; long shots can generate effects of objectivity, formality or coldness. Camera focus can shift
our depth of field, revealing or obscuring objects around the subject. The angle of the shot can affect
our sense of height and gravity. If the frame is not level, we can be tilted off centre. Low- or highangle framing positions us to be looking up or looking down at the shot, often with vertigo-inducing
effect. Shots can also position us to see omnisciently or link us to particular characters.
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And of course, while one can study the tone and composition of the shot, one must also account for its
existence as a moving image. As Bordwell and Thompson remind us, different aspects of the mise-enscene will grab our attention by means of changes in light, shape, movement (Bordwell & Thompson,
2004: 207-216). Movement here can be happening both at the level of the subject and at the level of
the camera. Within a single image, different elements/actors/objects can be moving at different speeds.
Further, the camera may be tracking the movement, or it may be stationary. The camera itself may also
be mobile in a variety of affect-inducing ways. The mobile camera in Blair Witch Project produces
quite different affects than the mobile camera in the (single shot) Russian Arc.
Questions about Time are answered by attention to the editing techniques used to link shot to shot
(Bordwell & Thomspon, 2004: Chapter 8). Techniques of editing can produce visceral responses,
leaving us feeling dislocated or even nauseous. Editing determines how long an image stays on the
screen. Our sense of time is shaped through the knitting together of shots. Shots can be joined in a
number of different ways: cuts, fades, dissolves, wipes, and blackscreens. Editing can shape our sense
of special relations, of rhythm, and speed, can generate graphic matches or senses of discontinuity.
They also shape our sense of temporal relations through ordering the series of events: flashbacks,
ellipsis, overlapping and returning shots, the frequency of cuts.
Finally, but certainly not last, are questions about Sound. Sound works on our bodies. Sound is a wave,
a vibration. Those vibrations are not just ‘heard;’ they impact the body, passing through and setting up
other vibrations in their wake. As people in the deaf community point out, sound can be felt even if it is
not heard. This is something most of us understand at a visceral level from the experience of sitting in
a symphony, of standing beside the speakers at the high school dance. Indeed, we come into existence
as humans with the drumming rhythms of a heartbeat marking our development. Patricia Pisters quotes
Walter Murch on this primal aspect of sound:
“We begin to hear before we are born, four-and-a- half months after conception. From then on,
we develop in a continuous and luxurious bath of sounds: the song of our mother’s voice, the
swash of her breathing, the trumpeting of her intestines, the timpani of her heart. Throughout
the second four-and-a-half months, Sound rules as solitary Queen of our senses: the close and
liquid world of uterine darkness makes Sight and Smell impossible, Taste monochromatic, and
Touch a dim and generalized hint of what is to come.” (Pisters, 2003: 177)
Sound is powerful. Most of us know intimately music’s capacity to make us laugh, weep, or shudder;
we know its capacity to produce goose bumps (Schwarz, 1997). As Kurosawa says of his own filmmaking, “The most exciting moment is the moment when I add the sound. … At this moment, I
tremble.” (quoted in Bordwell & Thompson, 2004: 348)
Though sound can seem difficult to study, there are many questions one can ask about the affects
produced through a film’s sound design. Sound can be diegetic (coming from events occurring within
the story’s world) or non-diegetic (music, or other sounds added to enhance the film’s action). Three
types of sound can be operating: speech, music, sound effects. In each case, mixing techniques can
allow for changes in the perceptual properties of these sounds: loudness, pitch, and timbre. Sounds of
breathing, the breaking of a glass, the beat of the heart, and the ticking of a clock can be heightened or
altered for aural impact. Sounds also have spatial dimensions. Sound plays a role in defining the onscreen and off-screen space (the rock that finally hits the bottom of a well, the locking of a prison door,
the drop of water from the tip of a stalactite). Sounds can be synchronous or non-synchronous,
increasing a sense of the fidelity of sound to image, or of its rupture. The sound that accompanies the
image actively shapes how we interpret that image (Bordwell & Thompson, 1985). Film music
polarizes the emotional atmosphere and influences the understanding of the plot (Bullerjahn &
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Güldenring, 1994). A film’s sounds (and its silences) shape what we know, and how that knowledge
feels.’ Mary Ann Doane (1985) puts it thus:
The ineffable, intangible quality of sound – its lack of the concreteness which is conducive to
an ideology of empiricism – requires that it be placed on the side of the emotional or intuitive.
If the ideology of the visible demands that the spectator understand the image as a truthful
representation of reality, the ideology of the audible demands that there exist simultaneously a
different truth and another order of reality for the subject to grasp. The frequency with which
the words ‘mood’ or ‘atmosphere’ appear in the discourse of sound technicians testifies to the
significance of this other truth.” (at 55)
In arguing for the importance of attending to images and sounds, we do not suggest that these elements
of perception produce specified meanings. That is, sound does not necessarily produce only one set of
affective responses. Sound enters into neural networks that are themselves shaped by social factors.
Different people can have different responses to sound or image, just as different people can have
different responses to words. We agree with those who would say that meaning is constructed in the
gap between text and reader, that meanings are a co-production. It is simply that we believe this to be
no less true of images and sounds than it is of words. Just as scholars attend to the multiple functions
of words in the construction of subjectivities (Chunn & Lacombe, 2000), they can attend to the role of
images and sounds in this process. We agree with Connolly that the work of analyzing films “helps us
to discern multimedia techniques at work in organizing perceptual experience, consolidating habits,
composing ethical habits and spurring new thoughts into being.” (2002: at xii)
As legal theorists, it is the connection between affect, thinking and subjectivity that ultimately interests
us. Our attention is not on film technique for its own sake. We are less interested in understanding
how a film’s special effects are produced than in understanding how various cinematic techniques work
through us to produce affects, be it terror, elation, confusion, or grief. Attention to filmic technique
(and to the language used to describe it) can help us make visible the ways in which film participates in
the production and maintenance of structures of feeling (in both the story world, and in the world
outside the theater doors) through the weaving together of Words, Images, and Sounds.
PART II: How Films Work on Us: Intensities, Resonances, Displacements
This section of the paper is an experiment in trying to think and write differently as legal scholars about
filmic technique and its impacts on us as viewers. We combine some of the insights drawn from our
own efforts to reflect on particular films that have resonated with us, with a conception of the embodied
and affective subject-as-viewer. Here, stepping back from the narrative dimensions of the films, we
argue that the experience of the scene is as much a product of what is seen and heard as of what is said.
The goal is to explore how attention to affect through image and sound opens up additional avenues of
analysis for Law-and-Film. In this Part, we do two things. First, we consider how the images and
sounds in a pivotal sequence from The Piano help place the viewer in a certain kind of (embodied)
judging position. Second, we explore the ways that the initial affective stance of a film can be linked to
its larger narrative and political stance, by comparing the quite different introductory sequences of
Minority Report and Dead Man.
i.

Audio & Visual encounters in the Body: The Piano

Let us turn then to Jane Campion’s 1993 film The Piano. The film is set in the 19th century. Ada
(Holly Hunter), a mute woman with a young daughter, is sent to New Zealand as a ‘mail-order-bride' to
7

her husband, Stewart (Sam Sheppard). Ada, mute by choice, speaks both with her hands in an artistic
wave of sign language, and through the keys of her beloved piano, a piano that her new husband is
unwilling to have carried back to the homestead. He leaves it behind on the wave pounded beaches
where Ada has landed, and then agrees to sell it to a neighbor, Baines (Harvey Keitel). Baines offers
Ada a sexualized bargain for the return of her piano/voice. What begins as a prostituted relation shifts
into one of mutual desire once Baines chooses to terminate the contract and give her back the piano.
The film has been discussed by many scholars, from multiple perspectives (Hanigsberg, 1995; La
Forest, 1995; Dyson, 1995). Here, we want to focus exclusively on a pivotal and deeply disturbing
sequence near the end of the film, where Stewart, who has discovered the infidelity, chops off Ada’s
finger. Here, the injury done to Ada plays out in accordance with the generic conventions for tales of
‘love gone wrong:’ a husband discovers that his wife loves another, falls into a rage, and
punishes/disciplines her through an act of violence.
The filmic sequence is devastatingly powerful, but its affective power is not fully captured in the
narrative phrase “a husband chops off his wife’s finger.” There are many worse outcomes in tales of
jealous and possessive love. Given the film’s many references to Charles Perrault’s fairytale,
Bluebeard (in which a man chops off the heads of his overly curious wives), one might argue that
viewers are positioned to feel some relief that it is a finger, and not a neck that is severed. But the
shape of the filmic experience, far from offering relief, shook us in ways that many narrative accounts
of violence against women have not. In discussing how the scene worked, we noted our enduring
recollection that time had slowed down in mute recognition of the profound shattering of Ada’s world.
And yet, on re-viewing the film, it was also clear that there had been no slow-motion techniques of the
Chariots of Fire sort. The question for us was then, how (cinematically) did the film produce the
shocked feeling of a rupture in time, of something being ripped out in our own bodies? If we shift the
register of inquiry away from the words, and attend to the images and sounds wrapped up in the
sequence, it is possible to see how the structure of the film pushes us in the direction of an affectively
powerful embodied experience.
The sequence begins with Stewart standing at the top of a steep hill, where he has intercepted a
package from Ada to Baines. The camera is positioned higher on the hill than Stewart, and filmed at a
vertigo inducing incline, leaving the viewer feeling the need to lean back for safety. Thunder rumbles
ominously in the background as Stewart unwraps the package, and moves uphill (towards the camera).
We see his face as he reads the message inside, grabs an axe and starts moving away. The camera then
shifts to a position over the edge and part way down the hill, so Stewart stumbles down the hill past us,
the diagonal of the hill cutting a slash across the screen, the sky framing the bodies above. As he
moves, the theme music starts playing in the background. In a minor key and with a ¾ beat (waltz
time), complicated by an occasional extra few beats giving the feeling of a syncopated extra gulp of air,
the music pulls in a forward direction.
The scene cuts to the (now dark and rain-drenched) woods that stand between the hill and the house.
The color tone of the film stock changes to blue/grey, bleeding the scenery of warm colors. There are
five shots in this 22 second sequence, each of either Stewart or Flora (Ada’s young daughter) running
through the forest. Each of these shots is filmed so that trees stand between the camera and the
characters; as they run, they seem to be continually disappearing and reappearing from behind trees.
One’s eyes are forced to dart rapidly back and forth from edge to edge of the screen. No shot is held
long enough to get a stable view, and the framing often gives us parts of bodies rather than wholes, or a
close-up of Stewart’s hand holding the axe. The music also increases in volume.
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The scene shifts to the inside of the house where Ada waits. Stewart bursts in through the door,
plunging his axe first into the table where Ada is seated, and then into her piano. Yelling all sorts of
stock phrases (I trusted you! Why do you make me hurt you? We could have been happy! You make
me angry! You lied to me! You will answer for this!”), he slams her against several walls, and across
the piano. The increasing panic is captured in the increasing rapidity of shots: in the 35 seconds that
the camera is in the house, there are 13 shots. Stewart drags her out into the pounding rain, as she
claws wildly at the doorframe and laundry in an attempt to free herself. In the next 40 seconds, there
are another 13 shots. A series of short shots rapidly take our eyes between Flora, Stewart and Ada.
There is then a more sustained shot (11 seconds long), but though the camera stays still, the wrestling
Ada and Stewart themselves slip (and are dragged) in and out of the frame. The tempo of the music
speeds up, and volume increases. Further, the music becomes more erratic, and we hear ‘mistakes’ –
gasping repetitions of small musical phrases, repeated out of sync as if panic and confusion were
disrupting the music’s own knowledge of where it was to go next. There are then a quick series of (9)
shots cutting back and forth between Ada, Stewart, the shrieking Flora, a close-up of Stewart holding
Ada’s hand down on the chopping block, screaming at (the mute) Ada, “Do you love him? Is it him
you love!?” The music hits a crescendo as the axe is brought up and then down through the air. The
block of wood and her hand are below the level of the shot, so we do not see contact, but hear a hyper
emphasized ‘thwack” of ax into wood (and flesh and bone).4 The pounding background music stops,
and the camera focuses on the terrified face of Flora who scream out ‘mother!’ as the child is hit on the
side of the face and front of her dress with a gush of blood.
And then there is silence. Ten long seconds with no music. There is just the barely perceptible sound
of the rain still pouring on the three still characters. Visually, this 50 second segment contains only 3
shots. The first shot (6 seconds long) centers the chopping block, where Ada pulls her mutilated hand
away from the axe and stumbles back to her feet, and out of the frame. The second shot (3 seconds) is a
close-up of Ada’s waistline, where she has one hand wrapped around the other. Her hand occupies at
least ½ of the screen space, and the blood oozing between her fingers and down the front of her dress is
the only patch of color against the background of grey-blues. The third shot has the camera shift back
up, framing her face. The camera stays mobile for 45 seconds. Ada stands still, minimal emotion
visible in her mud and rain-streaked face, holding the bleeding hand to her chest. Her eyes focus first
on one side of the screen, then with a slow lowering of the eyelids, shift to the other. She turns her face
and back to the screen, and then moves away from us, as the theme music finally begins again. If the
music had doubled in speed leading up to the cutting, it is now at half the original speed, moving
forward in a syncopated but wooden rhythm. At a similarly slowed speed, Ada moves away from us.
Over the artificially heightened sound of the still pouring rain, and the muted and attenuated theme
song, we can hear the hyper-intensified sucking sound of the mud in each of her slow footsteps away
from us. The heightened effect of these muted sounds is like that of nerves vibrating at an intensified
level. Ada, her back to us, stumbles to the ground, pushes herself back up, takes another slow step
forward, then slowly buckles to the ground as her knees seem to give way, her skirt, resting in the mud,
billowing out like a mushroom as she collapses in a sitting position, the dress puffed up around her.
The images and music accelerate in the first half of the scene to produce an increasing sense of anxiety,
panic, and terror which peak with the drop of the axe. From that point forward, the images and music
participate in a slowing down and stretching out of our experience of time and the body. The effect is
rather like the heightened consciousness experienced just after a terrifying event. In that moment, the
heartbeat has slowed back down, but one is still conscious of every thump and pound. Not only do we
think we have seen Ada’s trauma, we have experienced something of it –the panic, the trembling, the
catch in the breath, the numbing of the extremities, the ringing in the ears. While not all viewers will
have experienced this scene in exactly the same way, very few would be unaffected by it.
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Such attention points us in the direction of the techniques involved in constructing a set of powerful
embodied reactions to a film, reactions which are linked to the politics of the film and its vision of law
and legal subjectivity. In this scene, viewers are made to feel the wrong, to linger with the horror and
injustice of Stewart’s response to Ada. The visual and sound techniques work powerfully with the
narrative to press viewer bodies into a moment of judgment – judgment not only of the moment of
violence, but also of the legal and social contexts that position Stewart both to feel himself aggrieved,
and to exercise authority over Ada’s body and will. If, as Boal (2002) says, the whole body thinks, this
scene from The Piano performs the insight that the whole body judges. The film deploys affect to
exactly this end, positioning us to judge with our bodies, and not just our intellect.
ii. Setting the Mood: Two Opening Scenes
In the next section, we consider the affects produced by two equally powerful but quite different
opening scenes. In discussing in some detail the layering of images and sounds that fill the first few
minutes of the films Minority Report and Dead Man, we hope to reveal how the production of affect
influences how we respond to particular films. These opening scenes engage us with distinctive sets of
sensations and intensities long before we have any cognitive sense of the plot or story that will drive
the action in the film. Yet, in making sense of the film, our contention is that we are responding as
much to these pre-cognitive intensities, as to a particular storyline. This is what makes film particularly
powerful as a medium for moving us as viewers.
Moreover, the distinctive affect of each of these films links to different socio-legal politics. Much
existent Law-and-Film scholarship already works to reveal the politics of our contemporary socio-legal
orders. The goal is to extend that canon by better understanding how film mobilizes these political
effects to particular ends. This requires a more comprehensive account of both the narrative and
affective dimensions of a film than we can provide here, since it is often the case that the narrative
purports to convey a particular message that is simultaneously undermined by the affects produced in
the film (Kamir, 2006). However, in beginning to explore the responses particular films set us up to
experience, and in trying to understand what kinds of subjectivities those responses tend towards
producing, Law-and-Film can open up a new dimension for exploring legal-politics in film.
a. Minority Report
Minority Report is science fiction thriller, adapted from a story by sci-fi writer Philip K. Dick. Set in
the not so distant future, an elite “Pre-Crime” law enforcement team has practically eliminated crime
through the use of three genetically altered humans. These Pre-cog(nitive)s can see into the future,
predicting crimes soon to happen, allowing for the pre-emptive arrest of the future offender. John
Anderton (Tom Cruise), head of Pre-crime and a steadfast believer in the system's flawlessness, finds
himself on the run when the Pre-Cogs predict that Anderton himself will commit murder within the
next 36 hours. Anderton struggles to discover the presence of a 'minority report' by one of the pre-cogs,
a report which might tell a different story and prove him innocent. Released in 2002, the film engages
directly with a very contemporary concern about the politics of affect, hypothetically posing the
question: how many democratic freedoms would fearful subjects be prepared to sacrifice for assured
safety? That is, if we somehow knew about the most heinous crimes before they were to be committed,
would it then be possible to capture and punish the perpetrators in advance? It is a story that, especially
when viewed in the context of the recent resurgence of doctrines of pre-emption in American politics,
directly poses questions about the politics of fear.
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The question is posed even more resonantly below the narrative register, in the ways that the film’s
mood, its images and sounds, play on our sensibilities to amplify a sense of vulnerability, and fear of
violent crime. Certainly, the powerful images and sensations evoked by our first viewings of this film
remain with us, years later. One of us associates the film with a visual tinge of blue. The other, with the
physical sensation of shivering; of a chill that did not leave her even as she walked out of the air
conditioned theater in the summer of 2002. The film operated powerfully across the bodies of its
viewers, including our own, making skin crawl and shiver, inducing sensations of nausea (James,
2000). One of us found it virtually impossible to sit through the entire film again even when reviewing
it in her own living room for this project. Minority Report is as much about the feelings of paranoia,
anxiety and fearfulness it induces, as the story of vengeance, retribution and justice it plays out.
Something in the speeds, the colors, the jolts, the music, the screaming, incites sensations of panic and
the need to escape. The film seems to produce in the viewer a certain affect that we might describe as a
‘heightened receptivity’ to the event onscreen, that is, a sense of being reduced to a twanging tuning
fork or vibrating wire.
The viewer is placed to occupy the same affective dimension as the ‘pre-cogs’ – genetically damaged
individuals who are can see violent crimes before they are actually committed. The visions of the precogs are powerfully affecting. They resonate in the visual, auditory, physical, and emotional
registers—the pre-cogs are often seen shaken/shaking during the witnessing, as they experience the
emotions of those whose impending death they inhabit. Although it is not immediately evident to the
viewer, the opening sequence of this film is one such vision, which has the dual effect of placing the
viewer in the subject location of the pre-cog and of introducing a sense of anxiety and a desire for
escape that seeps into/saturates the entire experience of watching the film. The opening scene is
remarkable in that it produces almost the same affective response as the film as a whole, yet it is
compressed into an almost wordless, impressionistic sixty second montage of rapidly edited images
(perhaps 35 shots) accompanied by a series of dissonant sounds and sound effects in the score produced
by veteran film composer John Williams, whose film score credits also include Jaws, Star Wars,
Superman, ET, Close Encounters, Raiders of the Lost Ark, Jurassic Park, Schindler’s List, Angela’s
Ashes, Harry Potter, and Memoirs of a Geisha.
The film opens in darkness, and we hear a drum beat, or a heartbeat, as one might hear it when
immersed in water, or amniotic fluid. Patches of white seep onto the black screen from top and bottom.
As the blocks of contrasting light and dark slide across the screen, there is the sound of something like
wind, then a high sustained string note getting louder, and (over the course of 17 seconds) the image
resolves into the close-up of a passionate kiss. The image itself is unstable, and slips in and out of
focus, giving the impression of the optical illusion where the image could be either two faces, or a
single goblet. The persistent sound of heartbeat, sporadically amplified by a single low ominous
drumbeat (like the sound of a battering ram against a wooden door), and the occasional sharp high
discordant string note, give the image a feeling of something ominous rather than erotic.
Suddenly, we see superimposed over the image of the lover’s kiss, a second image: a pair of sharp thinbladed scissors, covered in blood, lying on the floor. The ‘X’-shape of the open scissor-blades links the
faces together. With the harsh pluck of strings, the image seems to be ripped to the side of the screen,
to be replaced with an image of someone’s face and body being shoved under the water in a bathtub,
water and blood splashing over the side as the top part of the body is plunged under the water. The
screen goes dark, then a slice of light resolves into the image of a suited man walking up the stairs
towards us. The image, a roughly centered high-angle shot, occupies only ¼ of the screen, inky
blackness pressing on the image from either side, giving the impression that we are looking down the
stairs through a crack in the door above. The man approaches holding the scissors in his hands. We
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hear a single high string note increasing in volume, with the deep sound of a heartbeat pounding in the
background. With another jerk, we cut to a shot above of a half-dressed couple in bed, the man
jumping backwards in shock at the man in the suit (the husband?) who suddenly appears beside the
bed. In rapid succession, there is a close-up of the woman looking up towards the man in shock; an
obstructed shot of the back of his suit; another shot of the bathtub, water and blood splashing out; a
limp hand over the edge; a shot of the woman leaning forward on the bed (edges of the screen disrupted
like the beginning kiss scene). These images are punctuated by single violent string notes (plucked and
bowed) and sounds of water (splashing, dripping, sucking). Positioned as witnesses at the open
bedroom door, we see the lover scrambling away on the floor, followed by the husband who lifts the
scissors high above his head. The scissors plunge down, and we cut to an image of the scissors (blades
closed) plunging through a piece of paper, with a hyper emphasized slicing sound. The image shifts to
a high-shot a small boy slicing the scissors through the eye of a magazine image of a face.
We cut back to the bedroom, at a different angle, part of the screen distorted by darkness. The
husband, standing by the bed, picks up his glasses, saying “You know how blind I am”. He pulls on
his glasses, still holding scissors in his hand, as the woman sits on the bed, pressing back against the
headboard in shock. The next shot places us on the other side of the bed, the husband in front of us. As
the woman says, “Howard, don’t cry”, he pulls back his arm, foregrounding the scissors. A dissonant
string note increases in volume as two rapid shots place us first at the bottom of the bed (where we see
the husband raise the scissors and plunge them down towards the woman), then suddenly on the bed
itself (as he plunges the scissors up and down towards us), each movement accompanied by intensified
slashing noises. There is some mirror like distortion in each these shots, as if we are watching through a
prism, or through water.
A snap-shot of scissors falling through the air in slow-motion, then we are positioned outside the
bedroom, the empty bed centered, sheets and covers awry, a huge streak of blood splattered and
dripping down the screen before us. We cut to a side-view of the woman sitting in the bed, blood
pouring from a wound by her heart, her chest heaving up and down. Cut to a close up of the lover’s
gasping face; a medium shot of the lover huddled on the ground with hands over his mouth; a long shot
of the woman falling over in the bed in slow-motion; a shot from one end of the bathtub, as the suited
husband plunges the lover’s face and body under the water. Then, a close up of the woman’s face. She
is horizontal across the screen, lying on her back, throat is exposed, eyes open and unblinking, a line of
blood tracing a line from her heart on the left towards her ear on the right. The camera zooms in to a
close up of the woman’s open but unblinking dead eye. The image trembles, as if we are seeing it
through the twitching eyes of someone else. The image of the dead woman’s eye seems overlaid with
the image of another eye, lashes wildly fluttering, and the image snaps into clarity of a wide open blue
eye, pupil dilated. The heart beat, low drums, sustained dissonant notes, plunging and slicing sounds
that have been building to this point also snap into sudden silence.
In a single shot, the camera zooms back out from the eye until we have an entire face framed on the
screen: a white-skinned shaved-headed woman lying on the surface of the water in some kind of pool,
wearing something like headphones, her face just above the waterline, eyes open in terror. She
whispers the word “mur-der” (in two long extended syllables). The sound echoes in what feels like a
cavernous space. Then her body sinks slowly down until her face (eyes still open) is under the surface
of the clear water. From the moment we first see her eye until the shot ends, ten seconds pass. This
feels like a moment of interminable stillness, as the previous 50 seconds contained over 30 shots.
The filmic techniques (both scene and sound) locate us in the place of the pre-cog in the opening
sequence. They also work to locate us emotionally or affectively in that subject position for much of
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the duration of the film (James, 2002). We are positioned by the film as its affective ‘receivers’. We
never really recover from the opening barrage of rapid-fire images from multiple directions and
perspectives. The images themselves are terrifying, more so for being partial, disconnected, and out of
order. The sound effects and the orchestral soundtrack are similarly dissonant and threatening. The
ominous sense of imminent danger and the desire to escape to safety persist throughout the film.5
b. Dead Man
Let us now shift from Spielberg’s dystopic neo-noir Hollywood vision in Minority Report to Jim
Jarmusch’s haunted post-modern western Dead Man. The characteristically minimalist plot of the film
(also written by Jarmusch) centers around Bill Blake (Johnny Depp), a naïve young accountant from
Cleveland who travels west to the town of Machine, only to discover the letter of employment which
had prompted his journey was ‘not worth the paper it was written on’, invoking the western’s classic
pre-occupation with the potency of law on the frontier. Blake inadvertently becomes involved in a love
triangle involving the film’s only English speaking female character, Thel (Mili Avital). When Thel is
shot by her jilted lover Charlie (Gabriel Byrne), the bullet passes through her and lodges in Blake’s
chest, next to his heart. As Blake has in return shot and killed Charlie, he becomes an outlaw with a
bounty on his head. Blake encounters a mixed blood indigenous character named Nobody (Gary
Farmer). Nobody, believing the dying man to be the poet William Blake, sees it as his role to
accompany the dying man to the coast, where his soul can be returned to its appropriate resting place.
The majority of the film traces the journey undertaken by the two men, pursued by numerous bounty
hunters. The journey ends on the edge of the ocean near a Makah village, where Nobody procures a
ceremonial canoe and launches the ‘deadman’ Blake across the mirror/out to sea.
Dead Man is set in the space of the Western, yet the feeling of the film is quite unlike what one expects
of the Western, a genre that, whether articulated from a traditional or revisionary point of view,
generally foregrounds the dichotomies of law/lawnessness and nature/civilization and founding
violence at the heart of the Myth of the Frontier (Slotkin, 1992; Tompkins, 1992). This film seems to
give us markers of the genre, but then dislocates them. ‘Land’ does feature prominently, but rather
than seeing sweeping vistas, our vision is circumscribed so we see relatively little of the incredibly
numerous locations: pine forests, river banks, mountain passes, ocean front, and two small settlements,
the frontier town of Machine and a coastal village inhabited by the western indigenous tribe of the
Makah. Further, even where we have the landscapes of the West, they are not delivered in the dusty
earth-tones we expect. Instead, the film is shot in black and white with a richly textured palette of grey
tones. It offers up the stock characters of the western, but they are all strangely altered—we get
cowboys that cross-dress and sleep with teddy bears, and British-educated ‘Indians’ who quote poetry.
Even where the film delivers on the Western’s promise of violence, it does so in ways that disrupt the
feelings we might expect the violence to produce. It is a film that moves very slowly, its long shots
typically separated by several seconds of black screen and/or silence. This film’s tone, its settings, its
edits and the remarkable score provided by Neil Young (a score characterized by harsh and nonresolving melodies and chords, distinctly atonal in orientation), all work together to disorient us in both
time and space. This is a film that produces a quite distinctive affect of dislocation, de-familiarization,
and ‘deterritorialization’, in the Deleuzian sense of ‘smooth space’ in which something new might
come into existence (Patton, 2002).
But how do Image and Sound in particular contribute to the generation of the film’s affects? To that
end, again we will consider just the opening sequence of the film. We begin in the dark, with the sound
of a train whistle the first indicator of the space into which we will emerge.6 An amplified guitar note
reverberates, and decays over the sound of the train, and we have a sudden close-up of the moving
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wheel of a steam engine. The train sound drops in volume, and we cut to the inside of a train
compartment. The guitar note has faded, so we hear only the clacking of wheels on rails, and the
squeak of a lantern swinging from the roof. An extended close-up of a man’s face (the very
recognizable Johnny Depp, as of yet unnamed as Blake) is interspersed with similarly extended shots of
what he sees: the swinging lantern above his head, passengers in the other seats of the compartment, a
view of the landscape through the slats covering the window. Each shot is held long enough that we
have time to look closely at faces, and passing landscapes. This is followed by several seconds of
‘nothing’: the screen goes black. We return to the opening shot of the moving steam engine wheel,
the sound of wheel and steam increase in volume, and over them is again the sound of an amplified
guitar. The guitar is amplified, and reverberates and echoes over one or two notes. The music vibrates
away as we cut back to the interior of the compartment. Again, the compartment is silent but for the
noise of the train. Again we have a close up of Blake, this time reading a magazine. This is followed
by an eye line shot of the “Bee Journal” he is holding in his hands, a shot sustained long enough for us
to cast our eyes over the ads and article titles on the open pages before us. Again, this is followed by
several seconds of black screen, then the image of the train wheels accompanied by harsh guitar notes,
and then a return to the train compartment. Blake is playing solitaire. We have no sense of how much
time or space has passed. A series of eye line shots reveals some new passengers in the compartment.
When Blake looks out the window, the landscape has changed. We see an abandoned pioneer wagon,
punctuated by a two sudden and reverberating guitar notes. Then, black screen. Again, the pulsing
rhythmic and musically enhanced sound/image of the moving steam engine, followed by a return to the
silent interior of the compartment. We see (shot from Blake’s point of view) a newly changed
landscape through the window slats, a close-up of Blake/Depp’s largely inscrutable face and a view of
the newly configured passengers.
This rhythm continues for the first five minutes of the movie, a rhythm built up through the repetition
of images and sound, a rhythm that produces a generalized low level sense of unease and discomfort,
and an increased demand to look for more, to search the images and sounds for familiar markers. In
this first five minutes, there is no dialogue, and no ‘action’. We cannot track time or place, other than to
say both are passing. Blake remains dressed exactly the same, though the passengers in the
compartment do shift with every iteration: fewer women, fewer men in suits, more men with beards
and fur hats carrying rifles. The increasing ‘roughness’ of the other passengers begins to generate an
increasing sense of unease and dislocation. That sense is reinforced both by the continual insertion of
the slightly disturbing Neil Young guitar music, as well as by the slight side-to-side action of the
moving train compartment: the heads of all the passengers are moving gently from side to side with the
rocking motion of the train. The camera shots are long and sustained, and there is very little
movement. The movement that grabs the eye comes from the shifting light through the window slats
and the slight (though perceptible) back and forth motion of all the passengers. In the body, this
generates the feeling of a slight edge of motion-sickness. This slight sensation of discomfort resonates
with and immerses us in the narrative: we are clearly on a journey, but with no knowledge of who ‘we’
are, where we are going, and whether or not it is dangerous. The black screens disrupt us in time and
space. The people in the train compartment change and yet don’t.
Again, the opening scene presages an affect, here--of dislocation, that seeps through the entire film.
From the beginning, we are given images and sounds that fail to resolve as we expect. The music fails
to deliver chords or melodies that resolve things. We hear intervals that open without closing, and that
are dissonant and disruptive. The music feels as ‘undomesticated’ as the landscapes we see. The
landscape changes in nearly each scene, (mountains, snow, forests), but no matter where we move, we
never move to something that leaves us feeling that we have arrived. The black and white film stock
robs us of visual markers for warmth and coolness. It is difficult to tell if is sunny or cool. Even day
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and night are not easily distinguishable. There is no ‘familiarity’ in a deep sense, though we can
recognize that we are in or moving through terrains that change. Even the faces of the characters in the
film, in their cool expressionlessness, are in some measure akin to the landscapes, as they fail to deliver
indicators of emotion that might help to orient us. We are required to scan the images ourselves,
searching through and around them to pull together some possibilities for meaning. The general affect
of dislocation also opens up space for the possibility of reading the colonial encounter in other than
expected ways.
There is a skillful use of image and sound to produce distinctive affects in the opening scenes of these
two films, opening scenes that provide an evocative site for comparison. Minority Report, typical of
the action genre, uses rapid sequences of images and sound effects to propel us into the story at heartpumping speed, and to immediately create in us a sense of anxiety and insecurity. Dead Man does
almost the opposite: time is slowed down through the use of long still shots with little movement in
them. The shots are frequently separated from each other by up to several seconds of black screen.
The passage of time and space is explicitly placed in question in these cuts. The effect of a jump cut is
just the opposite – it doesn’t give you time to think. In Dead Man we are led to experience a sense of
disquiet and disorientation through the stretching out of sound and image, whereas in Minority Report
our anxiety and sense of entrapment is intensified by a barrage of sounds and images, especially in its
first minute. Where Minority Report terrorizes, Dead Man haunts.
Conclusions: New Interdisciplinary Configurations for Law and Film Scholarship?
Elizabeth Grosz has argued that we need “to have a more nuanced, intricate account of the body’s
immersion and participation in the world.” (2004: 2) Indeed, this insight is particularly important for
legal scholars, as theorists such as Jennifer Nedelsky (1990) have pointed out. The disembodied
‘reasonable man’ of liberal legal thought is not only unhelpful, he is downright dangerous for those
whose bodies are colorful, gendered, or differently abled (Coombe, 1995). The thrust of much critical
scholarship has been to attend to the experiences of these differently situated subjects, and even to
‘embody’ them in certain ways.
Yet, as we noted at the beginning, we continue to observe a gap between our (feminist) intentions to
give more import to the fact of embodiment in our theoretical frameworks, and the limits of our
capacity to actually capture relevant aspects of this experiential dimension in our writing. This chapter
has been an effort to move in this direction, to pick up tools and techniques for doing this type of
thinking, and to provisionally put them to work in the reading of these three different scenes from three
quite different films. Each of these films raises questions about law, judgment, socio-legal politics, and
the construction of legal subjectivity.
In The Piano, attention to sound and image helps us make visible the ways in which the film positions
viewers to engage in practices of embodied judgment. The filmic sequence offers both a (narrative)
argument about gendered inequality, and a viscerally embodied experience of the trauma of gendered
violence. The film positions us to judge with our entire bodies. In Minority Report, we see how the
barrage of sound and images works to produce pre-cognitive orientations of anxiety and paranoia.
While the images and sounds do not dictate how a person will read the film, the result is an overloading
of the senses, leaving little time for thought, functioning a bit like the adrenaline in the freezing at the
dentist. Deadman produces a quite different affect. Again, the sounds and images do not dictate the
kinds of judgments the viewer will make, but the techniques of image and sound used do tend to press
the viewer towards a more open space of judgment, one in which new meanings must be constructed,
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one in which the viewer will have to actively participate. This affective orientation is no less
‘political.’
Scholars in the law-film community have increasingly reminded us of the need to attend to the ‘film’ in
Law-and-Film. Law-and-Film scholarship, as it continues to move outwards from more traditional
representations of law in films, classic or Hollywood, and towards new interdisciplinary configurations
in multiple directions or lines of flight, could take this call seriously. Further, we will profit from a
more profound engagement with the range of theorists currently attempting to think through the
significance of affect. Such work calls on us to think about ‘the body politic’ differently, and to
grapple theoretically with movement, affect and sensation. Political theorists such as William
Connolly and J.K. Gibson-Graham have attempted to extend such conversations across disciplinary
borders, to draw political, legal and social theory into a more sustained engagement with film theory,
an engagement designed to grapple in more nuanced ways with the manner in which thinking and
affect are bound together. The filmic experience or event is one that can be returned to, thought
through, grappled with, and used on the self as a technique for opening towards new political
possibilities and ways of being. We make a connection between this work and the work of scholars
like Stuart Motha (2007), who have taken on the challenge of opening up the spaces of law to new
forms of political subjectivity. There is, we suggest, particularly in these times where politics of fear
are so ascendant, some urgency in attempting to think otherwise about our inherited ways of
understanding the role of affect in our sense of ourselves as legal subjects, legal actors, and decisionmakers.
Law-and-Film scholarship needs to attend not only to the (fixed) representative or ideological
dimension of film, but to its movement, its flux and possibility as energy. There is value in opening up
the ways that we as individuals and legal scholars can work with the films that work on and through us,
moving us, through visions and hauntings, through shrieks and echoes, towards new potential
identities, new alliances, and new possibilities for ways of being in the world.
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1
See for example the work of Lorna Williams, http://www.chairs.gc.ca/web/chairholders/viewprofile_e.asp?id=1971&
2
It should be noted that while they are sometimes difficult to hold apart, there is an important distinction to be made
between ‘affect’ and ‘emotion’. Brian Massumi (2002) speaks of affect in terms of ‘intensities’ and makes a compelling
case (on the basis of several neuroscientific experiments) for the significance of distinguishing the two: “Emotion is
qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed
progressions, in narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognized. It is
crucial to theorize the difference between affect and emotion.” (at 28)
3
Here, I am reminded of a conversation I had with my dentist. I told him I found it bizarre that no matter how calm I felt
about getting a needle, the experience always left me feeling anxious. He told me that the freezing contained a mixture of
adrenaline, which helped the freezing take more rapidly. The slight pounding of my heart was not the product of my
internal anxiousness, but the product of a small amount of a heartbeat enhancing drug.
4
This point is nicely made in Chumo (1997) who notes that the scene resonates with one earlier in the film where, during a
play, Bluebeard seemed to be attacking his wife with an ax but wasn’t. Here as well, the art of the scene is such that acting
and editing techniques make Ada’s loss of the finger seem real.
5
This sense of looming danger may in fact be enhanced by the film’s tendency to periodically snap into an exaggerated
representation of safety and normalcy, as when it cuts to an advertisement touting the benefits of the “Pre-Crime
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Investigation Unit” that follows the dramatic arrest of the man who is predicted to commit the murders we think we see in
the opening minute.
6
Lynne Kirby (a Senior Producer at Court Television Network) argues that “cinema has enjoyed a special kinship with the
railroad, a mutual attraction based on similar ways of handling speed, visual perception, and the promise of a journey,” and
that “trains and rail travel embodied concepts of spectatorship and mobility grounded in imperialis, and the social, sexual,
and racial divisions of modern Western culture.” (Kirby, 1997: back cover) See p. 250 for her argument that the train gave
us cinema (though the windows) before there was cinema. You can see this in the scenes with Johnny Depp looking
through the windows at the passing scenes.
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